Some ten years ago, a Catholic virtue ethicist group blog linked to something on my father’s blog, Vulgar Morality. So long ago was this in Internet years that I cannot even find the virtue ethicist blog in question, and my father had not moved to WordPress yet, but was using Radio UserLand—a for-pay frankenstein hybrid between desktop publishing and blogging.
It was my first encounter with the very concept of virtue ethics, but I didn’t really look into it at the time. I remember my dad remarking “there seems like there’s something to it, but I don’t really understand where the virtues are supposed to come from.”
It was years before I took any interest in the virtues again. I won’t bore you again with the details, but suffice to say that if you’ve spent any time at Sweet Talk at all, you’re probably aware I have a bit of an interest in the subject these days.
A year ago I attempted to think about this question of where the virtues come from.
David, sensing epistemological arrogance, was quite critical of my post:
How, just how do you think that you would ever in a million years have any confidence in knowing the telos of the sum of your short number of breaths in this mortal coil? That really is the nub of the thing: one simply does not have enough time to contemplate the day ahead before its sun sets, and you expire, going to rest in the dust.
My response amounted to “something something historically contingent something something Heraclitus’ river.”
Having let that discussion sit for some time, I’d like to return to it again, now that I have a more hermeneutic understanding of virtue.
Now, like a year ago, I think the answer must be something like the version of naturalism elaborated by Philippa Foot. She speaks of “goodness” in the sense of “a good specimen of X.” A sickly, or uniquely asocial chimpanzee would not make for a good example of chimpanzees. It might be useful, for human purposes, if we wanted to understand the sicknesses that sometimes befall chimps or the range of social deviance from the norm, and what happens to such deviants in the wild. But we could not even do this without a sense of what a good specimen is like, in contrast to the deviant.
As Adam Sandel puts it, the way of life of chimpanzees points towards their good. A good specimen is healthy, pro-social, skilled at hunting and defending against rival groups, and so forth. In this sense the good chimp is “above average;” you cannot get a sense of it by merely averaging the qualities of the group.
These days I think what everyone wants is to be able to situate their moral philosophy in an evolutionary story. But David put it best; the question of what something is is distinct from how it came to be.
When Father Carves the Duck is an easily recognizable Thanksgiving ritual, lampooned. “How Ritual Came To Be” informs us readily with descriptors of primal provenance, e.g., the sacrificial duck, but it hardly addresses what is going on presently in this ritual, and why the poem resonates among cultural participants. If the description of what is going on travels too far from “familial interaction,” it fails to be an effective describing process for the purpose of application. In other words, there is no sacrificial duck here. What, then, is this?More distinctions are needed to be made. More work.
The fact that we can discuss how father came to have the role of the one who carves the duck at Thanksgiving in terms of primal environments or sacrificial rites does not tell us what the nature of that role is now.
Consider a more straightforward example: the heart. Asking “what is the heart?” is much more straightforward than “how did humans evolve to have hearts?” We can observe the heart in action. We have a robust medical tradition of studying hearts in various states of health. We have a very good idea of what hearts do and what a “good heart” consists of. We do not have to answer the evolutionary question before we can answer the question of what a good heart consists of. If anything, our investigation takes the opposite direction; we use our stronger evidence and better information about what the heart is to try and figure out its evolutionary origins (may a thousand “just so” stories bloom).
So when we ask “what is virtue?” or “what is a good person?” we can put to the side, for the moment, the question of “how did virtue or ‘the good’ come to be?”
Aristotle understands our comprehensive “situation,” or “life perspective,” in terms of the good life. The good (to agathon), he writes, is not some abstract form to which we look for guidance but a concrete end (telos) expressed in our action (praxis). Whenever we make things, put them to use, and live out certain roles, our actions aim at the good (whether or not we consciously reflect upon the good as our aim). For “the good,” Aristotle maintains, is the end of all ends— that “for the sake of which everything else is done.” As such, the good is both the aim of our action and its condition. It is the ultimate end (telos) toward which we strive, and, at the same time, the source, or beginning (arche), of all striving.
Virtue and the good life exist in a holistic relationship. We try to become the person we need to be in order to get the kind of life that we believe we should have. We have to understand the life in order to understand what kind of person we should be, but we need to understand what kind of person we should be in order to understand what sort of life we should lead. Virtue and the good life are a hermeneutic circle.
But our understanding of this relationship isn’t stuck in an infinite regress. It is incomplete, projective, and revisable. This is why Aristotle insisted that a philosophy of ethics would be lost on the young, who as of yet know very little about life. As we grow up and live our lives alongside other people living their lives, and receive an education, we are exposed to countless stories in books, films, and even video games—and of course, stories told to us by people in our lives. We begin to adjust ourselves towards some understanding of a good life, however haphazard or tacit.
These experiences expand our horizon, giving us a fuller, richer picture of what the good life is and what kind of person it takes to live it.
We can get a sense of what the good is and what the virtuous person is from how people live their lives. But again, this is not an averaging. As with the examples of the heart and the chimpanzee, it’s a proper notion of a good based on an understanding of what people are.
And as with those examples, how we arrive at this understanding isn’t mysterious. Pay attention, live your life, read what other people have said on the subject, and use your judgment. Join the conversation; try to persuade but be open to being persuaded.
That is my understanding of what virtue is and how we come to understand it.
Edit: Found the original discussion mentioned in the first paragraph.
3 thoughts on “Where Do the Virtues Come From?”
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Life experience is the majority of how people learn ethics, but it can’t be everything since so much of what we do is new and unfamiliar. Storytelling is a broad category. People tell stories of great heroes, of groups of people with virtues we admire, but storytelling also includes much of economics. We tell epic tales of that time when China went from collective farming to semi-free markets and freed billions from poverty. We tell stories of pin factories, woolen coats, and linen shirts. Storytelling is consequentialist in a sense. If you do X, if you act in this manner, here is how it will play out. Tragedy is “how not to act”.
I don’t really like moral system isolationism. I think all methods have their insights. Utilitarianism tells us “consider everyone”. Consequentialism tells us “think about the consequenses”. Virtue ethics tells us how a good person should act. As with epistemology, I think the best approach to morality is eclectic.
In some sense, I think you’re right. I believe in methodological pluralism. I recently read a great paper on how models we know are wrong in a straightforward sense are still extremely useful. I think utilitarianism or consequentialism are often useful tools, and economists have refined them into extremely useful tools.
I don’t think virtue ethics is an all-encompassing thing, without some serious work in metaphysics and ontology, something I have not done and am not knowledgeable enough to do. However, I do believe it is by far the best, and also the most encompassing: https://sweettalkconversation.com/2015/04/03/unifying-moral-philosophy-with-virtue-ethics/
Nevertheless, I think that these are questions that philosophy (or social science) can’t _really_ answer, because they have to be answered from _within_ our lives, not from standing aside and observing it. I think that, to return to pluralism, many different perspectives can shed important light, but this supposes there’s something to have light shed on.